We consider a simplest Markov decision process model for intrusion tolerance, assuming that (i) 
Introduction
Intrusion tolerance is an active area of research that aims to extend proven solutions in the elds of fault-tolerance and dependability to address growing concerns about weaknesses of modern-day information security systems [1] . The key assumption is that, even when state-of-the-art intrusion prevention and detection techniques are in place, an attacker will eventually break through. An intrusion tolerant system (see Fig. 1 ) is therefore also equipped with mechanisms for reacting in real-time to an ongoing intrusion, striving not just to detect its occurrence but also to diagnose or predict its evolution so that defensive countermeasures can be invoked timely enough to delay, frustrate or altogether thwart the attacker's ultimate intentions. Successful realization of this vision introduces numerous technical challenges, including the embedded design of real-time sensing/response devices as well as the automatic control of these devices to favorably in uence the system's security status over time. 
Figure 1. An Intrusion Tolerant System
This paper analyzes the problem of intrusion tolerance within the formalism of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) [2] . MDPs are related to the types of stochastic models already popular in contemporary dependability/security research [3, 4, 5, 6] . Their focus is to assume that the model parameters (e.g., state transition probabilities & costs) in each decision stage depend explicitly on the control action taken in that stage. For example, an MDP can capture the reinstatement of security (and the possible cost of disrupting all normal services) upon taking a cleansing "reset" action (e.g., initiating a server rotation [7] or perhaps a more elaborate recovery sequence [8] ); as another example, an MDP can capture the possible preemption of a security failure from a well-timed "defend" action (e.g., killing a process that is critical to the intrusion's continuation [9] ). In any case, the expected performance (e.g., mean-time-tofailure) is dependent on the policy, or rule that dictates how control actions are selected, and the optimal policy is one that achieves the best performance for a given model. Section 2 presents in detail a simplest MDP model for intrusion tolerance problems. Though the model assumes only three system states and only three candidate controls for ease of analysis, it is suf ciently rich to expose a number of important policy considerations for intrusion tolerant systems. In particular, even in the ideal case of perfect detectors (Subsection 3.1), it is sometimes sub-optimal in the long run to employ a policy that invokes defensive responses during the intermediate stages of an intrusion; more speci cally, depending on attack dynamics and response ef-fectiveness, policies involving only occasional reset actions may provide a better tradeoff between the total overhead of ongoing security maintenance and the total risk of potential security failures. The tradeoff between these two types of penalties is shown through simulation experiments (in Subsection 3.2) to persist in the realistic case of imperfect detectors. Moreover, these experiments evaluate empirically (i) the extent to which increasing sensor uncertainty monotonically degrades achievable performance and (ii) the loss from optimum performance of two popular rule-based policies for selecting responses. Despite the model simplicity, these rule-based policies are seen to incur up to 35% additional costs to those incurred by the optimized policy-an even greater percentage is conjectured for intrusion tolerance models of more realistic size and character.
MDP Model for Intrusion Tolerance
This section abstracts the problem of intrusion tolerance within the modeling formalism of a stationary, discretetime, nite-state, nite-action Markov Decision Process (MDP) [2] . Underlying such a model is (i) a nite collection of nite-state Markov chains, one per candidate control action, and (ii) the assumption that decisions are made in discrete stages: each stage begins in a particular state and, upon taking a control action, the process probabilistically transitions to a new state (or self-transitions to the same state), simultaneously ending the current stage and beginning the next. Thus, the outcome of each decision stage is de ned by the selected control and the realized state transition. In turn, an MDP model associates both a probability and a cost to every such outcome.
We categorize the security environment into only three states, labeled N , A and F to denote "operating normally," "under attack" and "security failure," respectively; there are similarly only three candidate controls, labeled W , D and R to denote a "wait" action, a "defend" action, and a "reset" action, respectively. The three diagrams in Fig. 2 summarize the single-stage transition probabilities/costs under each control action. For example, under the "wait" action (control W ), self-transitions in state N represent secure, normal operation of the information system; however, a transition from state N to A occurs with per-stage probability p A , representing the beginning of an intrusion attempt. Thereafter, self-transitions in state A represent a secure system being under attack; eventually, a transition from state A to F occurs with per-stage probability p F , representing the beginning of a security failure that persists inde nitely. Stages that begin in state N are cost-free, whereas stages that begin in state A incur a cost of c A and self-transitions in state F incur a cost of c F . These same probability/cost parameters apply under the "defend" action (control D), but with two differences: rstly, the possible transition from state A back to N (occurring with per-stage probability p D ) represents the successful disruption of the intrusion attempt; secondly, a cost of c D is incurred in addition to the transition cost under control W . Finally, under the "reset" action (control R), a transition back to state N occurs with probability one, incurring a cost of c R , no matter the state at the beginning of the decision stage. Summarizing, our simplest MDP model is described by three probability parameters and four cost parameters. The probability parameters may take values strictly between zero and unity; in particular, no value of one probability restricts the value of another. This re ects the fact that each probability parameter abstracts a different characteristic of the intrusion tolerance problem. More speci cally, probability p A relates to the frequency with which intrusion attempts are initiated, where larger values pertain to more aggressive attackers. Probability p F relates to the rate at which an initiated intrusion will penetrate the security system, where larger values pertain to more vulnerable systems (or perhaps just shorter-duration exploits). Probability p D relates to the success rate of a well-timed defensive countermeasure in preventing an otherwise inevitable security failure, where larger values pertain to more effective response devices. The cost parameters may take any set of non-negative values that satisfy the following inequalities:
• c A < c F , meaning that one stage of a security failure incurs more cost than one stage of an intrusion attempt;
• c D < c R , meaning that the reset action incurs more maintenance cost (because of e.g., a greater disruption to normal services) than the defend action; and
• c R ≤ c F , meaning that one stage of a security failure incurs no less cost than invoking the reset action.
Analysis of the Optimal Policy
Subject to design in a MDP is the policy by which, in each stage, all available information maps into each selected control, typically seeking to minimize the average-cost-perstage assuming a large number of stages. We now proceed to analyze the optimal policy for the simple MDP model described in Section 2. Subsection 3.1 will begin under the idealization of perfect detectors, in which case the optimal policy admits an analytical solution: its equivalence to the most natural policy (i.e., taking actions W , D and R when in states N , A and F , respectively) holds only for a subset of the possible parameter values. Subsection 3.2 continues the analysis for the case of imperfect detectors, evaluating alternative policies via a combination of numerical algorithms and Monte-Carlo simulations. Altogether, the analyses capture the inherent tradeoff between risk due to security failures and overhead due to defensive countermeasures; moreover, a control policy that fails to account for all model parameters is also likely to fail to maintain the best "long-run" balance between these two types of penalties.
The Case of Perfect Detectors
Let us assume perfect detectors for now: mathematically, in each stage k = 0, 1, . . ., the current state x k ∈ {N, A, F } is revealed before the control decision u k ∈ {W, D, R} must be made. Of course, the next state x k+1 remains uncertain until action u k is applied and the process proceeds to the subsequent decision stage. Let g(x k , u k , x k+1 ) denote the cost associated with the outcome of stage k e.g., in our model, it may be any one of the different transition costs provided in Fig. 2 . We desire a control policy that minimizes the in nite-horizon average-cost-per-stage
which under certain technical conditions (satis ed by our model) is known to be achievable with a stationary, or stage-invariant, policy [2] . This means, in our model, that the optimal policy is one of the twenty-seven functions of the form μ : {N, A, F } → {W, D, R}, each a different mapping from the state space to the control space by which every single-stage decision u k = μ(x k ) is to be made.
Given a particular policy μ, equations are provided in [2] to derive the associated average-cost-per-stage λ μ in terms of the given model parameters. However, under the assumptions on cost parameters stated in the previous subsection, it is easily seen that most of the twenty-seven candidate policies may be quickly dismissed. Firstly, because the only hope of exiting the failure state is by invoking the reset action (and c R ≤ c F ), we need only consider policies that map state F to action R. Secondly, because the defend action has no bearing on transitions out of normal operation, we need not consider policies that map state N to action D. This leaves only six candidate policies, three mapping state N to the wait action W and three mapping state N to the reset action R-let us rst evaluate the former three policies, each taking a different action when in state A.
Wait-upon-attack μ
W , or taking action W when in state A and incurring cost c A per stage until the transition to state F occurs, achieving
2. Defend-upon-attack μ D , or taking action D when in state A and incurring cost c A + c D per stage until the transition to state N or to state F occurs, achieving
3. Reset-upon-attack μ R , or taking action R immediately upon exiting state N , achieving
The remaining policies, namely those mapping state N to action R, each achieve an average-cost-per-stage of c R and can thus be dismissed by virtue of (3). First notice that comparing the policies (1)-(3) in terms of the Mean-Time-To-Failure (MTTF) would not fully capture the "long-run" cost tradeoffs. A failure occurs onaverage once every 1 + 1/p A + 1/p F stages under policy μ W and once every 1
Moreover, under policy μ R , the MTTF is technically in nite but, proactively, the reset action is invoked on-average once every 1 + 1/p A stages. So, regardless of the values of the three probability parameters, policy μ D results in the longest MTTF. In contrast, it is readily seen that the ordering of (1) (2), the same cannot be said for the respective denominators. In particular, the denominator of λ W is less than that of λ D if and only if the probability p F is less than 1/(1 + p A ). In general, the ordering of (1)- (3) depends on all model parameters, the probabilities as well as the costs.
It is also worth noting a few limiting properties of (1)-(3). Firstly, if probability p D approaches zero, meaning the defend action is nearly ineffective against an ongoing intrusion, then λ D ≥ λ W with equality only if cost c D is also zero. Secondly, λ R < λ W if and only if the cost ratio c A /c R exceeds the fraction p A /(1 + p A ). This is arguably surprising: despite its appearance in (1), probability p F has no bearing on the comparison between policy μ W and policy μ R . In particular, the ordering of λ W and λ R is unchanged even as p F approaches unity, or the case where each intrusion attempt almost immediately results in a security failure (e.g., a ash worm [10] ). In summary, assuming an ineffective defend action (in which case policy μ D is sub-optimal), policy μ R is optimal only in the case of sufciently infrequent attacks (i.e., only for small p A such that p A /(1 + p A ) < c A /c R is satis ed)-in the case of more frequent attacks, policy μ W is optimal. The preceding comparison between λ W and λ R can be expressed concisely by the inequalities
(4) The general characterization of the optimal policy also includes the other two pairwise comparisons of (1)-(3). The comparison between λ D and λ R reduces to the inequalities
while the comparison between λ W and λ D reduces to
with slope m and intercept b, respectively, given by Observe that probability p A affects all three pairwise comparisons, while probability p D affects only the latter two comparisons and probability p F affects only the last comparison. Viewing the (normalized) costs c A /c R and c D /c R as degrees-of-freedom, (4)- (6) form a system of linear inequalities with coef cients depending on the values of probabilities p A , p F and p D . In particular, the set of all normalized costs comprises the unit square, and each inequality alone de nes a partition of this unit-square in accordance with which of the two associated policies is preferable. In turn, all three inequalities together de ne the partition in accordance with which of the three policies is optimal. (1 + p A ) . Indeed, the region for policy μ D reduces in size as p D decreases (i.e., as the defend action becomes less effective), vanishing entirely as p D approaches zero. Next, as probability p F increases (i.e., as attacks more quickly bring about failure), the boundary between policies μ W and μ D pivots about the central meeting point as slope m decreases. Moreover, the sensitivity of the optimal partition to such changes in probabilities p D or p F is also a function of probability p A (i.e., of the frequency with which attacks occur).
For a particular choice of probability parameters, Fig. 4(a) plots the achieved average-cost-per-stage λ * (normalized by the reset cost c R ). It is seen to increase lin- Figure 4 . The (a) performance of the optimal policy in Fig. 3(b) , taking p A = 0.7, p F = 0.9 and p D = 0.8, and its tradeoff between (b) maintenance overhead and (c) failure risk.
early as either c A or c D increases unless these costs are such that policy μ R is optimal, in which case λ * plateaus at λ R . Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 4(c) illustrate that λ * is, in general, the sum of two types of security-related penalties. Here, we have denoted the maintenance overhead by λ * M , which is the sum of terms involving costs c D or c R , and the failure risk by λ * F , which is the sum of terms involving costs c A or c F . 1 For example, λ W in (1) decomposes into the sum of
The Case of Imperfect Detectors
The analysis thus far assumes that each control decision has access to perfect state information: the detectors never generate a false-positive nor a false-negative (i.e., never indicate state A if state N is true nor state N if state A is true, respectively) and, similarly, the presence or absence of a security failure is never in question (i.e., state F is indicated if and only if state F is true). To extend the analysis to the realistic case of imperfect state information, we turn to the more general formalism of a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) [11] . In addition to parameters of the MDP, a POMDP model assumes that each observation takes one of a nite set of values and then includes probability parameters that relate to sensor uncertainty. Our three-state model, for instance, could include (at least 2 ) two additional parameters: a false-positive probability q A|N and a false-negative probability q N |A ; notice that the ideal case is recovered when these probabilities are both zero.
The advent of imperfect state information has dramatic rami cations on the structure of the optimal policy and, in turn, the complexity of its analysis and computation. This stems from the fact that, in each stage k = 0, 1, . . ., it is no longer true that state x k is revealed before the control decision u k is made; rather, only an observation z k is revealed and it must be properly interpreted within the context established from all previously revealed information i.e., the observation history Z k−1 = (z 0 , z 1 , . . . , z k−1 ) as well as the control history U k−1 = (u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u k−1 ). Under certain technical conditions (satis ed by POMDPs), this interpretation is provided by the conditional probability distribution P (x k |Z k , U k−1 ), or the belief state-that is, for the purposes of optimal control, the belief state is known to be a suf cient statistic, essentially a lossless compression of the entire history of previously revealed information [2] .
A POMDP model features properties that greatly simplify the computation of successive belief states. Firstly, because the (hidden) state takes only nitely-many values, say n, the distribution P (x k |Z k , U k−1 ) is expressed by a length-n probability vector b k ∈ [0, 1] n , whose components sum to unity with the ith component, b k [i], denoting the probability that state x k is of its ith value. Secondly, by virtue of the Markov properties, implying in each stage k that (i) every state transition probability satis es
and (ii) every sensor observation probability satis es
the sequence of belief states can be computed recursively [2] : given the preceding belief vector b k−1 and with the next control u k−1 and observation z k both revealed, computē
for every i = 1, 2, . . . n and then normalize the vectorb i.e., then compute
for each i. The question that remains, of course, is how to design the policy by which each belief vector b k maps into the control u k . Decades of theoretical research has revealed interesting structure in the optimal policy, but also characterized the (worst-case) complexity of its computation to be prohibitive [12] . On the upside, a number of approximate solution algorithms have been developed that suitably exploit the problem structure and exhibit acceptable (average-case) complexity [13] . It is similarly more challenging, compared to the MDP counterpart, to evaluate the average-cost-perstage performance of any given policy.
The analysis of our simplest POMDP model will proceed by using the iterative "witness" algorithm 3 [11] to approximate the optimal policy and then a simulation-based MonteCarlo approximation to evaluate performance. The procedure must be repeated per instance of the POMDP model i.e., per choice of values for parameters p A , p F , p D , c A , c D , c R , q A|N and q N |A . (Recall that cost c F is not pertinent as long as state F is assumed to be fully observable.) In our experiments, each call to the witness algorithm returns the policyμ obtained at the 500th iteration, taking the discount factor to be 0.9999 and the initial state distribution such that x 0 = N with probability one. Each call to the Monte-Carlo performance evaluation returns the average-cost-per-stage over T = 100, 000 simulated decision stages, each stage k realizing random variables x k and z k according to the given model, updating the belief vector b k according to (7) and selecting control u k =μ(b k ) according to the given policy. Fig. 5 summarizes our experimental results for a particular set of costs and two different assumptions on attack dynamics, while taking the detector's two error probabilities to be equal and sweeping that value between perfect (at q = 0) and informationless (at q = 0.5). Consider rst the upper plot in each column: the optimized performance is seen to degrade monotonically with increasing error probability q; more interesting is that against infrequent/slow attacks, this degradation manifests itself as increases in both maintenance overhead and failure risk whereas, against frequent/fast attacks, the degradation manifests itself almost exclusively as increased maintenance overhead. Also shown in these upper plots is the benchmark performance λ * = λ D (from Subsection 3.1) in the perfect detector case. The lower plots in Fig. 5 contrast the optimized performance against that achieved by two simpler rule-based policies. The Perfect-Detector (PD) rule ignores sensor uncertainty altogether, applying the "wait" or "defend" action depending on whether the detector reports "normal" or "attack", respectively; the Most-Likely (ML) rule updates the belief vector b k via (7) but applies the "wait" or "defend" action depending on whether or not, respectively, probability b k [A] is less than probability b k [N ]. In the case of infrequent/slow attacks, even the PD rule is seen to perform close to optimum (e.g., less than 5% loss) for error probabilities up to q = 0.3, while the ML rule performs well for all q. In the case of frequent/fast attacks, however, the PD rule performs close to optimum only up to q = 0.1, exhibiting a peak loss of 35% at highest q; in contrast, the ML rule exhibits its peak loss of 15% at mid-range q, performing well in lowest & highest regimes of sensor uncertainty. 
